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Striking a Grotian Moment: How the Syria Airstrikes
Changed International Law Relating to Humanitarian
Intervention
Michael P. Scharf

Abstract
In the years since the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization airstrikes on Serbia to
prevent ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians, international law has been moving in fits and
starts toward recognition of a limited right of humanitarian intervention in the absence of United
Nations Security Council approval. But all the ingredients necessary for the crystallization of
customary international law were not present until the April 14, 2018 United
States/French/United Kingdom airstrikes on Syrian chemical weapons facilities. This Article
examines the distinctive circumstances of the April 2018 airstrikes, including the context of a
crisis of historic proportions, the focus on preventing the use of chemical weapons, the collectivity
of the action taken, the limited targets and collateral damage, the explicit invocation of
humanitarian intervention by the U.K. as the legal justification, and the U.S.’s apparent
adoption of that justification. It explores whether these factors have rendered the April 2018
airstrikes a transformative event that may have changed international law concerning
humanitarian intervention.

Table of Contents
I. Introduction............................................................................................................. 588
II. Background on the Syrian Airstrikes .................................................................. 590
A. President Obama Draws a Red Line.............................................................. 590


Dean of the Law School, Joseph C. Hostetler - BakerHostetler Professor of Law, and Director of
the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
co-founder and Managing Director of the Public International Law & Policy Group; former
Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs, U.S. Department of State. The author wishes to
express special thanks to Cox International Law Center Fellows Meghan Lunders, Joseph Shell, and
Matthew Casselberry for providing research assistance for this Article.

586

How the Syrian Airstrikes Changed International Law

Scharf

B. The April 6, 2017 Unilateral Airstrikes .......................................................... 591
C. The April 14, 2018 Multilateral Airstrikes ..................................................... 592
III. The Concept of Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law. 593
IV. The Changing Law of Humanitarian Intervention ......................................... 595
A. Historic Status of Humanitarian Intervention.............................................. 595
B. The 1999 NATO Intervention ....................................................................... 596
C. Development of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine ............................ 598
D. Was the International Reaction to the NATO Intervention a Grotian
Moment? ................................................................................................................. 601
E. Use of Force Against ISIS on Mount Sinjar ................................................. 603
V. Did the 2018 Syrian Airstrikes Constitute a Grotian Moment? ..................... 605
A. Articulation of a Clear Legal Rationale .......................................................... 605
B. The Response of the International Community ........................................... 608
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 612

Winter 2019

587

Chicago Journal of International Law

I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Since 2011, Syria has been engulfed in a protracted civil war that began as
part of the wave of Arab Spring protests against Middle East tyrants. 1 The Syrian
conflict has seen the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
terrorist organization,2 the largest refugee migration since World War II,3 and the
repeated use of chemical weapons against a civilian population. With all that, Syria
has become a dynamic laboratory for the creation of new international law.
Elsewhere, this author has explored how the use of force by the U.S. and its
allies against ISIS in Syria has fundamentally changed the international law of selfdefense against non-state actors.4 This Article, in turn, examines whether the
airstrikes against Syria on April 14, 2018 may have crystallized an emerging
customary norm of humanitarian intervention, thereby representing a historic
development in international law.5
The U.S., France, and the U.K. have said that they launched the April 2018
airstrikes to prevent the Assad regime from continuing to use chemical weapons
against the Syrian population.6 Before the Syrian airstrikes, most countries and
experts had taken the position that there was no international law right of
humanitarian intervention under customary international law or the U.N. Charter,
except when authorized by the Security Council.7 As detailed in this Article,
however, the three countries claimed a right of humanitarian intervention, and
the international response to the April 2018 Syria airstrikes has been
overwhelmingly supportive. Something is changing.

1

See Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, AP (Apr. 10, 2018), http://perma.cc/MA95-UFXT
(providing a detailed timeline of events related to Syria’s use of chemical weapons and the
U.S./France/U.K. airstrikes).

2

See generally Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 15 (2016).

3

Charlotte Alfred, What History Can Teach Us about the Worst Refugee Crisis Since WWII, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 12, 2015), http://perma.cc/L65J-WVC4; U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic (Nov. 21, 2017),
http://perma.cc/5M9S-DN3V.

4

See generally Scharf, supra note 2.
Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on Identification of Customary International
Law, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (“‘Customary international law’ means those
rules of international law that derive from and reflect a general practice accepted as law.”).
Historically, crystallization of new rules of customary international law was viewed as a protracted
process that took many decades, if not centuries, to complete. See Manley O. Hudson (Special
Rapporteur), Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/16 (Mar. 3, 1950).

5

6
7

U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8233 (Apr. 14, 2018).
Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107, 108–9 (2006).
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What to make of this change? Was this just a case where international politics
aligned against a rogue regime, or did the April 2018 airstrikes constitute a
transformative event in customary international and the interpretation of the U.N.
Charter? Some scholars have characterized such events as “International
Constitutional Moments.”8 But others, including this author, prefer to use the
label “Grotian Moment,” a term named for Hugo Grotius, the 15th Century Dutch
scholar and diplomat whose masterpiece De Jure Belli ac Pacis helped marshal in the
modern system of international law.9 This Article examines whether the airstrikes
against Syria in April 2018 in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical
weapons are one of these so-called Grotian Moments, marking a rapid change in
customary international law and in the interpretation of the U.N. Charter
concerning the right to use force for humanitarian intervention in the absence of
Security Council authorization.
The Article begins by setting forth the background of the 2018 airstrikes.
Next, it discusses the principles and process of customary international law
formation and the phenomenon of accelerated development of customary
international law. This is followed by an examination of the evolving view of
humanitarian intervention, starting with the 1999 NATO airstrikes. Finally, the
Article explores the unique aspects of the Syrian airstrikes, including the context
of a crisis of historic proportions, the focus on preventing the use of chemical
weapons, the collectivity of the action taken, the limited targets and collateral
damage, the explicit invocation of humanitarian intervention by the U.K. as the
legal justification, and the U.S.’s apparent adoption of that justification. It
concludes that these factors may have rendered the April 14, 2018 airstrikes a
transformative event that has changed international law concerning humanitarian
intervention.
8

9

Stanford Law Professor Jenny Martinez, for example, has written that the drafting of the U.N.
Charter was a “constitutional moment” in the history of international law. See Jenny S. Martinez,
Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 463 (2003). Washington University Law
Professor Leila Sadat has similarly described Nuremberg as a “constitutional moment for law.” See
Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1206 (2007).
See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (2013). The term “Grotian Moment” was first
coined by Princeton Professor Richard Falk. See BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 1265–86 (2006). Grotius (1583–1645) is widely considered to have laid the
intellectual architecture for the Peace of Westphalia, which launched the basic rules of modern
international law. HEDLEY BULL ET AL., HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1, 9
(1990); See generally HAMILTON VREELAND HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE MODERN SCIENCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1917). While the results of Westphalia may have been simplified by the
lens of history, and Grotius’ role may have been exaggerated, Westphalia has unquestionably
emerged as a symbolic marker and Grotius as an emblematic figure of changing historical thought.
“Grotian Moment” is thus an apt label for transformational events in customary international law.

Winter 2019

589

Chicago Journal of International Law

II. B ACKGROUND ON THE S YRIAN A IRSTR IKES
A. President Obama Draws a Red Line
Since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, Syria has presented the
international community with monumental challenges to international peace and
security.10 Responding to the crisis has been complicated by the unique
geopolitical situation. Dating back to the 1970s, Russia has been a close ally of the
Assad regime, which allows Russia to keep its only naval base outside the former
Soviet Union at the Syrian Mediterranean port of Tartus. 11 As such, Russia has
vetoed Security Council resolutions condemning Assad’s harsh actions against the
civilian population, blocked the Security Council from authorizing investigations
into Syria’s use of chemical weapons, and prevented the Security Council from
referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC).12
In reaction to reports that the Assad regime had amassed chemical weapons,
on August 20, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama declared that Syria’s use of
chemical weapons would be a “red line.”13 The inference was that if the Assad
regime deployed the internationally banned weapons it would trigger an American
military response. He reiterated this threat on several occasions in the following
months.14 Then on August 21, 2013, the Assad regime used chemical weapons on
a large scale in the opposition-held Ghouta area of Damascus, causing 1,400
civilian casualties.15
In response, President Obama tried and ultimately failed to gain support
from Congress and international allies to launch a narrowly tailored attack on
Syria.16 At the time, polls revealed that only 36 percent of Americans favored the
U.S. taking military action to prevent Syria’s chemical weapons use, while 51

10
11

12

See generally U.N. SCOR, supra note 6.
See Sam LaGrone, Russia, Syria Agree on Mediterranean Naval Base Expansion, Refit of Syrian Ships, USNI
NEWS (Jan. 20, 2017), http://perma.cc/68QG-4UDQ.
U.N. SCOR, supra note 6, at 8.

13

Glen Kessler, President Obama and the ‘Red Line’ on Syria’s Chemical Weapons, WASH. POST (Sept. 6,
2013), http://perma.cc/UYG2-5U4Q.

14

Id.
U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council on the Report of the United Nations
Missions to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons on the Incident that Occurred
on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus (Sept. 16, 2013); Joby Warrick, More than 1,400
Killed in Syria Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://perma.cc/8PSL-X8YE.

15

16

Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2013), http://perma.cc/RX2T-E7J5.
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percent of those surveyed opposed such military action.17 Lacking congressional
and popular support, the Obama administration never took military action.
Rather, it accepted a Russian-brokered deal under which the Assad regime agreed
to give up its chemical weapons and submit to international inspections.18

B. The April 6, 2017 Unilateral Airstrikes
It soon became clear that the Russian-brokered deal had failed to prevent
Syrian possession and use of chemical weapons. On April 7, 2017, four months
after President Donald Trump entered office, the U.S. fired fifty-nine Tomahawk
missiles at the Shayrat Airfield in Syria. President Trump said the airstrike was
conducted in response to the Assad regime’s use of sarin gas, a chemical weapon,
on the town of Khan Sheikhoun—an attack that killed seventy-two people,
including a number of children, on April 4.19 Shayrat Airfield was targeted because
it had been used to store chemical weapons and aircraft employed in the April 4
attack.20
The United States acted alone, and President Trump did not articulate a legal
rationale for the airstrikes, but said that “[i]t is in the vital national security interest
of the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical
weapons.”21 U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki R. Haley said that the U.S. was
“justified” in striking the airbase as “a very measured step” and warned that the
U.S. was “prepared to do more.”22
Despite the lack of a stated legal justification, many of America’s allies
defended the missile strikes. The British Secretary of State for Defence, Michael
Fallon, said “we fully support this strike, it was limited, it was appropriate, and it
was designed to target the aircraft and the equipment that the United States believe
were used in the chemical attack and to deter President Assad from carrying out
future chemical attacks.”23 The European Union was similarly supportive, saying

17

Clare Malone, America’s Fickle Relationship with Humanitarian Intervention, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 10,
2017), http://perma.cc/8KGP-QQ9E.

18

Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14,
2013), http://perma.cc/8RHP-X6BF.

19

Remarks on United States Military Operations in Syria, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 238 (Apr.
6, 2017).

20

Id.
Id.

21
22

Somini Sengupta et al., U.S. Airstrikes in Syria: Fallout Around the World, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://perma.cc/H8CS-SBBW.

23

Anushka Asthana, Syria Airstrikes: UK Offers Verbal but Not Military Support to US, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/CE7X-RWUL.
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that Syria’s use of chemical weapons cannot go unanswered.24 In the Middle East,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey said they supported the missile strikes as a
“necessary and appropriate response.”25
Of all the states in the world, only Russia, Iran, Bolivia, and Syria opposed
the airstrikes. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the strikes “an act of
aggression under a completely invented pretext.”26

C. The April 14, 2018 Multilateral Airstrikes
In 2018, with Russia’s assistance, the Assad regime began the final push to
end its civil war, using overwhelming force to punish local populations where
insurgents remained active.27 On April 7, 2018, an attack using chlorine gas in the
eastern Damascus suburb of Douma killed more than eighty civilians. Believing
Assad’s forces to be responsible, on April 14, 2018, the U.S., France, and the U.K.
together launched another round of missile strikes against Syria.
“The nations of Britain, France and the United States of America have
marshalled their righteous power against barbarism and brutality,” President
Trump said in an address from the White House announcing the military action.28
“The purpose of our actions tonight is to establish a strong deterrent against the
production, spread, and use of chemical weapons,” he said.29 He added, “[w]e are
prepared to sustain this response until the Syrian regime stops its use of prohibited
chemical agents.” 30
One hundred three missiles were fired from a variety of naval vessels and
jets—about double what was launched in April 2017.31 The chairman of the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joseph Dunford, said the targets were “specifically
associated” with Syria’s chemical weapons program.32 They included a scientific
research facility in Damascus, a chemical weapons storage facility west of Homs,
and a chemical weapons equipment storage site and command post near Homs. 33
24

Syria War: World Reaction to US Missile Attack, BBC (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/ZSX3-F8UW.

25

Madison Park, Who’s with the US on Syria Strike and Who Isn’t, CNN (Apr. 8, 2017),
http://perma.cc/4GSZ-BNEB.

26

Id.; Syria War: World Reaction to US Missile Attack, supra note 24.
Daniel Brown, A Compelling Theory Explains the Latest Chemical Attack in Syria – and It Looks Like
Assad Got What He Wanted, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2018), http://perma.cc/TP67-Q52A.
Syria Air Strikes: US and Allies Attack ‘Chemical Weapons Sites’, BBC (Apr. 14, 2018),
http://perma.cc/5H3Q-WW7J.
Id.

27

28

29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Gen. Dunford Says Targets Linked to Chem Weapons, AP (Apr. 13, 2018), http://perma.cc/B84U-3DPL.
Id.
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“This is going to set the Syrian chemical weapons program back for years,”
Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie, a director of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, told reporters.34
Lamenting that the international investigators had just arrived in Douma to
begin their examination of the suspected use of chemical weapons there, Russia
called the airstrikes “an act of aggression” and a “violation of the U.N. Charter
and the norms and principles of international law.”35 But a Russian-sponsored
Security Council resolution that would have condemned the attack was soundly
defeated by a vote of three in favor, eight against, and four abstentions. 36 Both
inside and outside the Security Council, the international reaction to the airstrikes
reflected broad support.37

III. T HE C ONCEPT OF A CCELERATED F ORMATION OF
C USTOMARY I NTER NATIONAL L AW
Under the conventional view of international law, a state can use military
force in another state’s territory only in three situations: (1) with the latter’s
consent, (2) with Security Council authorization, or (3) when acting in self-defense
against an armed attack.38 None of these exceptions was applicable to the April
14, 2018 airstrikes on Syria.
The question this Article addresses is whether the April 2018 airstrikes have
crystallized a fourth situation in which force is allowed, namely to respond to and
prevent future use of chemical weapons against civilians when the Security
Council is blocked from authorizing humanitarian intervention by a Permanent
Member’s veto. If this right now exists under customary international law, then
such humanitarian intervention would not be in violation of Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, which only prohibits the use of force that is “against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state” and “inconsistent with the

34

35

36

37
38

Laris Karklis et al., Airstrikes in Syria Hit 3 Chemical Weapons Facilities, Including One in Damascus, WASH.
POST (Apr. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/6ET6-NUBE.
Alonso G. Dunkelberg et al., Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018, JUST SECURITY
(Apr. 22, 2018,), http://perma.cc/R8BS-DMX9.
See U.N. SCOR, supra note 6, at 3 (noting also Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assertion that
“Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took
a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus.
Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine
or any other toxic agent.”).
See generally Dunkelberg, supra note 35.
Goodman, supra note 7, at 111.
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Purposes of the United Nations.”39 Humanitarian intervention in response to use
of chemical weapons is not seeking to threaten the integrity of a state nor bring
about political change, but only to save lives and enforce the global ban on
chemical weapons.40
In the 1986 Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice observed that
“[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the
principle [of non-intervention] might, if shared in principle by other States, tend
toward a modification of customary international law.”41 The formation of
customary international law has been described as a process of continuous claim
and response.42 In the case of the 2018 airstrikes, the claim was explicit. The U.S.,
France, and U.K. articulated a right to humanitarian intervention in the face of
Syria’s use of chemical weapons against civilians. And the claim was not merely a
threat, but the actual deployment of force. As such, the three states acted as
custom pioneers—the first states to initiate a practice hoping that it will be
accepted as a new rule of customary international law by the international
community. Custom pioneers have no guarantee that their action will in fact lead
to the formation of a binding custom. Sometimes, as here, there is widespread
support for the claim, which can foster crystallization of the new rule. Other
times, there is widespread condemnation, which would set back the formation of
the new rule. And often there is a great deal of silence, which can be interpreted
as either acquiescence or indifference.43 Just “as pearls are produced by the irritant
of a piece of grit entering an oyster’s shell,” so the claims and responses of states
(including their silence) “produce the pearl—so to speak—of customary law.”44
Usually this claim and response process takes decades or even centuries to come
to fruition,45 but periodically world events act as accelerating agents that enable
customary international law to develop quite rapidly.46
39

40

Richard Ware, The Legal Basis for Air Strikes Against Syrian Government Targets, 7 (House of Commons
Libr., Briefing Paper No. 8287, 20198), http://perma.cc/8ZD7-YW48.
Id.

41

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27).

42

See generally Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L. J. 648 (1955).

43

See Wood, supra note 5, ¶ 42 (The International Law Commission has recently stated that
“[a]bstention from acting, also referred to as a ‘negative practice of States,’ may also count as
practice. Inaction by States may be central to the development and ascertainment of rules of
customary international law, in particular when it qualifies (or is perceived) as acquiescence.”).

44

Maurice H. Mendelson, Formation of Customary International Law, in RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 190 (1998).

45

See supra note 7.
See supra note 8.

46
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The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law describes two scenarios
where the world has witnessed the accelerated formation of customary
international law in the past.47 First, there are situations involving “the urgency of
coping with new developments of technology, such as, for instance, drilling
technology as regards the rules on the continental shelf, or space technology as
regards the rule on the freedom of extra-atmospheric space.”48 Second, there are
situations involving “the urgency of coping with widespread sentiments of moral
outrage regarding crimes committed in conflicts such as those in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia that brought about the rapid formation of a set of customary rules
concerning crimes committed in internal conflicts.”49 This author has previously
explored these scenarios in a book-length treatment.50
As described below, the 2018 airstrikes fall within both scenarios. They were
in response to the use of (1) unusual weapons and novel delivery systems, and (2)
crimes against humanity. Yet, one must approach the concept of accelerated
formation of customary international law with caution. As one author warns, “[i]t
is always easy, at times of great international turmoil, to spot a turning point that
is not there.”51 With this admonition in mind, the next Sections examine whether
the customary international law governing use of force for humanitarian reasons
has undergone rapid transformation in light of the 2018 allied airstrikes against
Syria.

IV. T HE C HANGING L AW OF H UMANITARIAN I NTERVENTION
A. Historic Status of Humanitarian Intervention
Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, state sovereignty has been regarded as
the fundamental paradigm of international law. Leading scholars have described
the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as
“the corner-stone of the Charter system.”52 This prohibition goes hand in hand
47

48
49
50

51

52

Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 24 (2006); see INT'L LAW ASS'N COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
(GEN.) INT'L LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2000).
Treves, supra note 47.
Treves, supra note 47.
See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (2013).
Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Alan Murray, Warning Is Sounded as Empire-Building Gains New
Cachet, WALL STREET J. (July 15, 2003, at A4)).
JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE 414 (1963); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 732 (2008).
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with the nonintervention principle enshrined in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter,
which prohibits coercive intervention into the exclusively domestic affairs of a
state.53
As discussed above, there are only three exceptions to the prohibition against
the use of force enumerated in the U.N. Charter.54 The first covers situations that
qualify as self-defense in the face of an armed attack under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. The second encompasses situations where the use of force has been
authorized by the Security Council under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter in
response to a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
And the third involves situations where the territorial state has consented to the
use of force within its borders.
In the last twenty years, the Security Council has significantly broadened
what it considers to qualify as a threat to the peace. The Security Council found
threats to the peace in situations involving widespread human rights violations
and humanitarian atrocities in Southern Rhodesia (1969), South Africa (1977),
Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999), and Libya
(2011). In 1992, the president of the Security Council acknowledged this
conceptual shift, stating “the mere absence of war and military conflict among
States does not itself ensure international peace and security; rather, intrastate
humanitarian situations can also become threats to peace and security.”55 Yet,
Security Council action is often thwarted by the threat or use of the veto by its
Permanent Members, and consequently, the Security Council has failed to
authorize humanitarian intervention in situations such as Rwanda in 1994, where
500,000 to a million deaths would likely have been prevented had the Security
Council acted.56

B. The 1999 NATO Intervention
The Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999 emerged out of the same historic backdrop
of ethnic tensions that had engulfed the former Yugoslavia in a brutal ethnic
conflict from 1991 to 1995. Kosovo was a region of Serbia where Serbs
constituted a minority and Albanian Muslims constituted the majority of the

53

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶¶ 203–5 (June 27).

54

Goodman, supra note 7, at 111.
Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect
Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 469, 470, 495 (2010) (quoting, in part,
U.N. President of the S.C., Note dated Jan. 31, 1992, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992)).

55

56

See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 58–60
(1998).
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population.57 In 1998, Serbian federal military and security forces began to
systematically attack the Albanian population, which fled to the mountains for
refuge in the face of widespread ethnic cleansing.58
In Resolution 1203 of October 24, 1998, the Security Council determined
that the Kosovo situation constituted a threat to the peace; insisted upon the
cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of certain forces and the commitment of the
parties to seek a political resolution; and authorized an OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission and a NATO Air Verification Mission to monitor
compliance with the provisional measures required under Resolution 1199.59 But
the Security Council did not authorize the use of force, and Russia made it clear
that it would veto any attempt to do so.
When the peace negotiations stalled and the brutalities continued, in March
1999 NATO decided to intervene with airstrikes against Serbian government
targets in Belgrade and throughout the country.60 The airstrikes involved 912
aircraft, which flew a total of 37,225 bombing missions in an effort to induce a
diplomatic resolution.61 The NATO countries had humanitarian motives; there
were no strategic or material interests of NATO nations in Serbia.62 After seventyeight days, the NATO bombing campaign ultimately convinced Serbia to sign an
agreement providing autonomy for Kosovo under the temporary administration
of the United Nations and protection of NATO forces. Subsequently, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999, which could be interpreted as
providing a sort of after-the-fact ratification of the NATO intervention.63
While their interests were purely humanitarian, the U.S. and U.K. declined
to provide a legal rationale based on humanitarian intervention. Instead, they
justified their actions on moral necessity. The reason for this was explained by
Michael Matheson, the acting legal adviser of the U.S. Department of State at the
time of the intervention, in the following terms:
About six months before the actual conflict, at the time when NATO was
considering giving an order to threaten the use of force, the political
community of NATO got together and had a discussion about what the basis
57
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of such threat of force would be. At the end of the discussion, it was clear
that there was no common agreement on what might be the justification.
There were some NATO members who were prepared to base it on a new
doctrine of humanitarian intervention; but most members of the NATO
Council were reluctant to adopt a relatively open-ended new doctrine. So at
the end of that week, the NATO political community said, here is a list of all
of the important reasons why it is necessary for us to threaten the use of
force. And at the bottom, it said that under these unique circumstances, we
think such actions would be legitimate. There was deliberate evasion of
making a “legal” assertion.
And this same process occurred in the U.S. Government. There were some
who wanted to articulate that humanitarian intervention in now the basis for
U.S. action. There was another theory from the Department of Defense,
which wanted to adopt sort of an expanded idea of self-defense based on the
general interest of the United States in the region; but on reflection, nobody
was really prepared to throw all the eggs into either of those baskets. So we
ended up with a formulation similar to that of NATO, where we listed all of
the reasons why we were taking action and, in the end, mumbled something
about its being justifiable and legitimate but not a precedent.64

When the principal state actors assert that their actions are sui generis and not
intended to constitute precedent, this does not create a favorable climate for the
cultivation of a new rule of customary international law.65 As such, the
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, chaired by the former chief
prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Richard Goldstone, characterized the 1999 NATO intervention as “illegal but
legitimate.”66

C. Development of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine
In the aftermath of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, the issue of
humanitarian intervention emerged as an important aspect of Secretary-General
Kofi Annan’s reform agenda at the United Nations. When Annan delivered his
annual report to the U.N. General Assembly later that year, he presented in stark
terms the dilemma facing the international community with respect to the idea of
unauthorized humanitarian intervention:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is
the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might
ask—not in the context of Kosovo—but in the context of Rwanda: If, in
64
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those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States
had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not
receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood
aside and allowed the horror to unfold?67

In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000, Annan posed a
similar question: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our
common humanity?”68
Rising to the challenge posed by the Secretary-General’s appeal, the
government of Canada established the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which in December 2001 submitted its report to
Secretary-General Annan. The ICISS report, entitled The Responsibility to Protect,69
contained two important innovations. The first was its suggestion that the debate
be shifted from focusing on the right to intervene to the responsibility to protect
victims of serious human rights violations—a concept that comprises prevention,
reaction, and post-conflict support.70 The second was its assertion that sovereignty
implies a responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from human rights
violations, and when the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its sovereign
responsibility, “it becomes the responsibility of the international community to
act in its place.”71
Drawing from principles of “just war” theory,72 the ICISS Report sets forth
criteria for deciding when military humanitarian intervention is warranted.
According to the ICISS, such action should only be employed in extreme cases of
large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing and where (1) the action is motivated by
the “right intention”; (2) the action is a “last resort”; (3) the action is proportional
to the threat; and (4) the action carries with it a reasonable chance of ending the
suffering.73
On the most important question of who can authorize humanitarian
intervention, the ICISS Report emphasizes the primary role of the Security
Council. However, should the Security Council fail to react (as when it is paralyzed
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by a Permanent Member’s veto), the report states that action by the General
Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution74 is a possible alternative that
would “provide a high degree of legitimacy for an intervention.”75
The report also mentions the possibility of action by regional organizations,
while pointing out that the U.N. Charter requires that they act with authorization
of the Security Council.76 Following the reference to the Security Council,
however, the ICISS Report refers to cases in which regional organizations have
carried out an intervention and only subsequently sought the approval of the
Security Council, concluding that “there may be certain leeway for future action
in this regard.”77
As to whether individual states or regional organizations can ever legally act
without Security Council authorization, the report is intentionally ambiguous.
While observing the lack of a global consensus on the issue, the report avoids
deeming such interventions illegal.78 Further, the report points out that there will
be damage to the international order if the Security Council is bypassed, but also
emphasizes that there will be “damage to that order if human beings are
slaughtered while the Security Council stands by.”79 The ICISS finds it intolerable
that “one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian
concern.”80 Thus, the ICISS urges the permanent members of the Security Council
to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights
abuses, and cautions that coalitions might take action if the Council fails to live
up to its responsibility.81
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D. Was the International Reaction to the NATO Int ervention
a Grotian Moment?
In the case of the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia, a major use of armed
force had taken place for humanitarian purposes without Security Council
authorization but with widespread support by the international community.
According to one scholar, the NATO intervention was “a case that expanded,
rather than breached, the law, similar to the Truman proclamation about the
Continental Shelf.”82 Others have described the NATO intervention as “a
watershed event” and “an important transition point in the shift from one
international order to the next.”83
Moreover, the NATO intervention led to the ICISS’s articulation of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, a concept that has been described as the
“most dramatic normative development of our time”84 and a “revolution in
consciousness in international affairs.”85 The 2001 ICISS Report characterized the
responsibility to protect as an emerging principle of customary international law,86
and the 2004 High-level Panel Report described it as an “emerging norm,”87 an
assessment shared by the Secretary-General.88 The R2P Doctrine was then
unanimously endorsed at the 2005 World Summit by the heads of state and
government of every U.N. member state, and later by the United Nations Security
Council. Based on these developments, in 2007 Professor Ved Nanda of Denver
University School of Law concluded that a government can no longer “hide
behind the shield of sovereignty, claiming non-intervention by other States in its
internal affairs, if it fails to protect the people under its jurisdiction from massive
violations of human rights.”89
82
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Yet, two roadblocks prevented humanitarian intervention outside the
framework of the U.N. from actually ripening into a norm of customary
international law following the 1999 NATO intervention and promulgation of the
R2P Doctrine. The first impediment was the ambiguity of the initial manifestation
of opinio juris that accompanied the acts of the NATO states. The participating
NATO states were not comfortable with the idea that the bombing campaign
would create a new rule of customary international law justifying a broad notion
of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Thus, in July 1999, U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright stressed that the air strikes were a “unique situation sui generis
in the region of the Balkans,” concluding that it was important “not to overdraw
the various lessons that come out of it.”90 U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair likewise
emphasized the exceptional nature of the Kosovo operation.91
The second obstruction had to do with the unfortunate timing of the ICISS
Report. Shortly after the Report was issued, in March 2003, the United States and
a “coalition of the willing” invaded Iraq without Security Council authorization in
part to prevent Iraq from deploying weapons of mass destruction and in part in
response to Saddam Hussein’s historic record of atrocities against Iraq’s Kurdish
and Shi’ite populations.92 The action was controversial and widely unpopular
across the globe, and prompted the U.N. Secretary-General to create the HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.93
The 2004 High-Level Panel Report (which was endorsed by the U.N.
Secretary-General) and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (which was
endorsed by the General Assembly and Security Council) were written to reflect a
much narrower conception in which humanitarian intervention is only lawful
when authorized by the Security Council.94 These developments signified that the
R2P doctrine had morphed into a conceptual framework for discourse, which may
be quite politically useful but was without legal force. The prohibition of the use
of force in the absence of Security Council authorization had been left intact,
leading the Rapporteur of the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances to comment that “the last few years has shown that the political
context within which the doctrine has to operate has severely limited its

90
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operation.”95 These developments prompted former U.S. Secretary of State
Madeline Albright to decry in 2008 that “[t]he notion of national sovereignty as
sacred is [once again] gaining ground.”96
The issue of whether Responsibility to Protect had been coupled to Security
Council authorization was tested in 2008, when Russia cited the R2P Doctrine to
justify its use of force to protect threatened Russian populations in the
neighboring country of Georgia that year.97 Perceiving the military action as a land
grab, the United States, European Union, and many other countries protested the
Russian invasion of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia provinces of Georgia.98 As
Nancy Soderberg, former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. has explained, “[t]he
Georgia case was really an abuse of power by Russia under an abuse of the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and it was not authorized by the U.N. and was
resoundingly condemned by the international community.”99 In a Los Angeles Times
opinion piece, Gareth Evans, one of the principal authors of the ICISS Report,
argued that the Russian action was clearly invalid because Russia failed to obtain
authorization from the Security Council.100 As Evans explained, “[t]he 2005
General Assembly position was very clear that, when any country seeks to apply
forceful means to address an R2P situation, it must do so through the Security
Council. The Russia-Georgia case highlights the risks of states, whether
individually or in a coalition, interpreting global norms unilaterally.”101
While the Russian pretextual invocation of the R2P Doctrine for its invasion
of Georgia constituted a further setback for the idea that humanitarian
intervention can be lawful outside the U.N. framework, developments in Iraq and
Syria in 2014–2018 may have supplied the tipping point to finally bring aspects of
the law of humanitarian intervention to fruition.

E. Use of Force Against ISIS on Mount Sinjar
In 2014, a terrorist group known as ISIS took over two-thirds of the territory
of Syria and Iraq. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2170,
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condemning the “continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human
rights” that ISIS was committing against populations that fell under its control.102
Then, in August 2014, ISIS captured the town of Sinjar in northern Iraq and
targeted the ethnic group that lived in the town known as the Yazidis for
extermination.103 Forty thousand Yazidis fled to nearby Mount Sinjar, where they
were trapped by ISIS forces that had cut off their egress.104
Without authorization by the Iraqi government or U.N. Security Council,
President Obama ordered U.S. aircraft to conduct airstrikes on the ISIS forces at
the base of the mountain to save the starving Yazidis. Explaining his decision to
authorize limited force under the circumstances, President Obama said: “The
Yazidis faced a terrible choice: starve on the mountain or be slaughtered on the
ground. That’s when America came to help.”105
President Obama had signaled his advocacy for recognition of a right of
humanitarian intervention a year earlier in a September 2013 speech to the United
Nations General Assembly:
Different nations will not agree on the need for action in every instance, and
the principle of sovereignty is at the center of our international order. But
sovereignty cannot be a shield for tyrants to commit wanton murder, or an
excuse for the international community to turn a blind eye. While we need to
be modest in our belief that we can remedy every evil, while we need to be
mindful that the world is full of unintended consequences, should we really
accept the notion that the world is powerless in the face of a Rwanda or
Srebrenica? If that’s the world that people want to live in, they should say so,
and reckon with the cold logic of mass graves. I believe we can embrace a
different future.106

While the United States would later justify its attacks on ISIS in Syria using
a novel theory of self-defense against non-state actors,107 consistent with President
Obama’s remarks to the U.N., its initial justification was purely humanitarian. 108
Under these dire circumstances, there was no international protest by any state
against this limited military action. The stage was set for the 2017 and 2018 Syria
airstrikes.
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V. D ID THE 2018 S YRIAN A IRSTRIKES C ONSTITUTE A
G ROTIAN M OMENT ?
A. Articulation of a Clear Legal Rationale
States broadly condoned the April 6, 2017 U.S. airstrikes against Syria, but
in the absence of a clear legal rationale, the case was viewed as sui generis—lacking
in clear precedential value. In contrast, there were three particularly noteworthy
aspects of the April 14, 2018 airstrikes that may have rendered the airstrikes a
Grotian Moment.
First, unlike its unilateral airstrikes on April 6, 2017, on April 14, 2018 the
U.S. did not act alone. It is harder for critics to argue pretext when a country acts
in concert with others for a humanitarian goal.
Second, whereas the U.S. avoided conveying a legal case for the 2017
airstrikes, in 2018 the three countries unequivocally stated that they believed they
had a right under international law in these circumstances to undertake the
airstrikes. Importantly, they did not suggest that the action was unlawful but
legitimate, as some have characterized the 1999 NATO action discussed above. 109
In its statement to the Security Council, France asserted that the airstrikes
were in compliance with “principles and values of the United Nations Charter,”
adding that “they serve the law and our political strategy to put an end to the
Syrian tragedy.”110
The U.S. told the Security Council, “[w]e acted to deter the future use of
chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime responsible for its atrocities
against humanity…. The responses were justified, legitimate, and
proportionate.”111 And in a press briefing, the U.S. Secretary of Defense added,
“We did what we believe was right under international law, under our nation’s
laws.”112 Notably, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued an
official opinion on the legality of the airstrikes on May 31, 2018, which observed
a convergence in the domestic and international law justifications focusing on “the
U.S. interest in mitigating humanitarian disasters” and in “the deterrence of the
use and proliferation of chemical weapons.”113
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In contrast to its statements following the April 2017 airstrikes, it is
significant that the United States did not employ the language of armed reprisal,
as this is considered unlawful under international law.114 Thus, at the U.N. on April
14, 2018, the U.S. Ambassador stated, “[t]he United Kingdom, France and the
United States acted not in revenge, not in punishment and not in a symbolic show
of force. We acted to deter the future use of chemical weapons by holding the
Syrian regime responsible for its crimes against humanity.”115
It is also significant that the U.S. recognized that chemical weapons
presented a special case. As President Trump explained after the Syria airstrikes,
“[c]hemical weapons are uniquely dangerous not only because they inflict
gruesome suffering, but because even small amounts can unleash widespread
devastation.”116 The use of chemical weapons have been outlawed since 1925,117
and the U.N. Security Council has specifically condemned the use of chemical
weapons in Syria in a series of resolutions.118 The U.S. concluded that Syria’s
continued use of chemical weapons would “desensitize the world to their use and
proliferation, weaken prohibitions against their use, and increase the likelihood
that additional states will acquire and use these weapons.”119 The U.S. argument,
then, is that “the prohibition of chemical weapons is nearly sacrosanct and can, in
certain circumstances, justify a forcible response.”120
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Third, the United Kingdom specifically relied on the theory of
“humanitarian intervention” in the context of preventing use of chemical weapons
to justify the April 2018 airstrikes.121 It stated that “[a]ny State is permitted under
international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to alleviate
overwhelming humanitarian suffering.”122 Echoing the main elements of the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the UK explained that such humanitarian
intervention is lawful when three conditions are met:
(1) There is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale,
requiring immediate and urgent relief.
(2) It must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the
use of force if lives are to be saved; and
(3) The proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the
aim of relief of humanitarian suffering and must be strictly limited in time and
in scope to this aim (i.e., the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for
no other purpose.123

The United Kingdom then detailed why it reasonably believed that the
airstrikes met these requirements, concluding “there was no practicable alternative
to the truly exceptional use of force to degrade the Syrian regime’s chemical
weapons capability and deter their further use by the Syrian regime in order to
alleviate humanitarian suffering.”124
This clearly articulated legal rationale distinguishes the 2018 airstrikes from
the NATO action in 1999. While the UK had first made public its views on
humanitarian intervention in 2014,125 this was the first time the rationale was tied
to concrete action taken by armed UK forces. Further, although the United States
did not similarly formulate a detailed justification, it did tell the Security Council
that “[t]he United States is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and France for
their part in the coalition to defend the prohibition of chemical weapons. We
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worked in lock step: we were in complete agreement.”126 It is conceivable that the
U.S. might subsequently assert that this wording was in regard to something other
than the U.K.’s legal theory, for example the timing of the strikes, amount of force
employed, or the target selection. But spoken by the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
at the same Security Council session where the U.K. articulated its humanitarian
intervention justification, these words can certainly be interpreted as an implicit
adoption of the U.K.’s legal position.127 This is particularly significant because the
U.S. has never before recognized a right of humanitarian intervention under
international law.

B. The Response of the International Community
The U.K.’s clear legal rationale may have laid the groundwork for a Grotian
Moment, but it takes widespread state action in support to crystallize an emerging
rule of customary international law.128
Fifty-six separate states and NATO (consisting of 28 member states)—for a
total of over seventy countries—publicly expressed opinions about the April 14,
2018 airstrikes.129 Of those, only a small handful, including Russia and Syria,
explicitly stated that the airstrikes violated international law. And Russia muddied
its position by focusing on the lack of proof that Syria was behind the chemical
weapons attack rather than an unequivocal statement that unauthorized
humanitarian intervention is always unlawful,130 probably because such a
statement would have been contrary to the legal argument it invoked as
justification for its invasion of South Ossetia, Georgia in 2008.131
For a case in which there was not a debate in a large international forum
such as the U.N. General Assembly, seventy states from every region of the world
is actually a fairly large sample from which to discern widespread state practice. In
fact, scholars who have carefully dissected the judgments of the International
Court of Justice have concluded that “most customs are found to exist on the
126

Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111.
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U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with Commentaries, (2001), http://perma.cc/U98H-SQF3 (citing international cases where
a State’s unequivocal acknowledgment and adoption of another’s position will render the State
retroactively responsible for it).
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2d Rep. on the Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 5, ¶ 53, 63, 69.
Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
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Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111 (Russia
told the Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in
Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time
in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military
experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.”).
ASMUS, supra note 98.
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basis of practice by fewer than a dozen States.”132 This is because international law
considers states that elect not to weigh in on an issue of general concern as
providing silent support or acquiescence.133 In the case of the S.S. Lotus, for
example, the Permanent Court of International Justice (the forerunner of the ICJ)
relied on the absence of protest against legislation based on the objective
territoriality doctrine of jurisdiction in finding that such an exercise of jurisdiction
was permissible under customary international law.134
The state reactions to the April 2018 airstrikes can be characterized as falling
into four categories. First, there were those states that expressed recognition of
the lawful nature of the military action. This was typified of the statements of the
U.S., U.K. and France, as described above, which each affirmatively asserted that
the airstrikes complied with international law.135
Second, nineteen states and NATO (thirty-eight states in all) expressed
approval of the airstrikes with implicit statements concerning legality. These states
represented Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the
Pacific.136 Typical of the language used was the statement of Germany, which
stated, “[t]he military strike was necessary and appropriate in order to preserve the
effectiveness of the international ban on the use of chemical weapons and to warn
the Syrian regime against further violations” (emphasis added).137 Similarly, Italy
said “[t]he US, France and the UK action against this use of chemical weapons
was justified.”138 And Spain said “[t]he strikes are a legitimate and proportionate
response to the brutal attacks committed by the Syrian regime against the civilian
population.”139 While terms such as “necessary and appropriate,” “justified,” and
132
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Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 767 (2001).
David Koplow, International Legal Standards and the Weaponization of Outer Space, in U.N. INST. FOR
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, SECURITY IN SPACE: THE NEXT GENERATION, CONFERENCE REPORT
31 MAR. – 1 APR. 2008, at 160; 2d Rep. on the Identification of Customary International Law, supra
note 5, ¶ 42 (“Inaction by States may be central to the development and ascertainment of rules of
customary international law, in particular when it qualifies (or is perceived) as acquiescence.”).
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
The states of this type included Colombia, Saint Lucia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Israel,
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Japan, South
Korea. Id. NATO is made up of 28 States: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
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“legitimate” are somewhat ambiguous, they can be read as a statement regarding
legality under the circumstances.
Third, some states expressed disapproval of the airstrikes without a
statement concerning illegality. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for
example, said “Brazil reiterates its understanding that the end of the conflict can
only be reached through political means, through negotiations undertaken in the
framework of the United Nations and based on Security Council resolutions.”140
Other states in this category indicated their concern that the Organization of the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had not yet completed an
investigation of whether Syria was behind the use of chemical weapons at the time
of the airstrikes. Thus, the Prime Minister of Algeria said “Algeria can only regret
the strikes … It would have been necessary to wait for the findings of an
investigation into the alleged chemical attack before taking any steps.” 141
Equatorial Guinea likewise said, “[u]ntil we have reliable proof of the alleged
chemical attack which took place last weekend in Douma, the Republic of
Equatorial Guinea believes that no aggression is justified.”142 These statements
suggest that had the U.S., France, and the U.K. waited until the OPCW completed
its investigation and concluded that Syria was responsible for the use of the
chemical weapons, states such as Algeria and Guinea would have accepted the
legality of the airstrikes.
And finally, eleven states expressed disapproval while including an explicit
statement that humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization
is contrary to international law.143 The clearest statement of this type was by South
Africa, which said “[t]he alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria cannot be a
justification for military airstrikes in a territory of a sovereign state without the
authorization of the UN [Security Council].”144 Bolivia was likewise clear, saying
“Bolivia condemns the illegal use of force and calls for compliance with
international norms that prevent violations of peace and security and keep the
most powerful states from attacking the weakest states with impunity.”145 Eleven
states is a small number out of the nearly 200 that make up the modern community
of nations.
More significant as evidence of state practice than public statements are a
country’s votes in the U.N. Security Council. In this case, only Bolivia, China, and
140
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Russia voted in favor of the Russian draft Resolution to condemn the April 14,
2018 airstrikes.146 Cote d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden,
the U.K., and the U.S. voted against condemnation. And Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, and Peru abstained.147
Some commentators have argued that even if the April 14, 2018 airstrikes
did represent a newly emergent international law right to humanitarian
intervention, customary international law simply cannot prevail over the U.N.
Charter.148 But as former State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh points out,
“it is not nearly so black and white as the absolutists claim, because textual
ambiguity in Article 2(4), the broader structural purposes of the U.N. Charter, and
some recent significant state practice give far more legal play in the joints than
textual absolutists would concede.”149 In this case, the U.N. Charter is being
interpreted to allow for a customary international law right of humanitarian
intervention in the narrow circumstances of preventing the use of chemical
weapons. This is consistent with the Charter’s Purposes and Principles, which
include “maintaining international peace and security,” “promoting and
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U.N. S.C., Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2018/355 (Apr. 14, 2018). The text
of the Russian draft resolution stated:
The Security Council,
Appalled by the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its
allies in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
Expressing grave concern that the aggression against the sovereign territory of
the Syrian Arab Republic took place at the moment when the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission team has just begun
its work to collect evidence of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma
and urging to provide all necessary conditions for the completion of this
investigation,
1. Condemns the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its
allies in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
2. Demands that the US and its allies immediately and without delay cease the
aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and demands also to refrain from
any further use of force in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
3. Decides to remain further seized on this matter.
Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111, at 22–
23. Russia told the Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat
airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext,
this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian
military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.” Id. at 3.
See, for example, Dapo Akande, The Legality of the UK’s Air Strikes on the Assad Government in Syria (Apr.
6, 2018), http://www.scribd.com/document/376483861/Akande-Opinion-UK-Government-sLegal-Position-on-Syria-Strike-April-2018 (memo prepared by Oxford Professor for MP Tom
Watson, Deputy Leader of the UK Labour Party).
Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOU. L. REV. 972, 1017 (2016).
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encouraging respect for human rights,” and “sav[ing] succeeding generations from
the scourge of war.”150

VI. C ONCLUSION
In the years since the 1999 NATO airstrikes on Serbia to prevent the
slaughter of the Kosovar Albanians, international law has been moving in fits and
starts toward recognition of a limited right of humanitarian intervention. But all
the ingredients necessary for a so-called “Grotian Moment” to come to fruition
were not present until the April 2018 airstrikes on Syria.
As discussed in this Article, there were several circumstances that made the
2018 airstrikes distinctive. First, for the past seven years, Syria has represented the
greatest humanitarian crisis on the planet. As with the changes to international law
ushered in by World War II and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia of the
1990s, the urgency created by the Syrian crisis set the stage for rapid development
of customary international law. As with the other Grotian Moments identified by
the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law discussed in the beginning of
this article, this context serves as a kind of accelerating agent, enabling customary
international law to form much more rapidly and with less state practice than is
normally the case.
Second, the 2018 airstrikes were undertaken collectively, rather than by a
single state. Unlike the 2008 Russian invasion of South Ossetia, Georgia,151 the
2014 U.S. airstrikes against ISIS at Mount Sinjar, or the 2017 U.S. airstrikes against
the Syrian airbase, collective action like that undertaken in April 2018 helps ensure
that the military force will not be perceived as a pretext for a land grab or regime
change.
Third, the participating countries asserted the legality of the April 2018
airstrikes and embraced a common justification—humanitarian intervention—
rather than cite only factual considerations that render use of force morally
defensible. For customary international law to rapidly crystallize, custom pioneers
must be consistent in their articulation of the new rule, its contours, and
application. Two former State Department legal advisers, Harold Koh and John
Bellinger, have criticized the U.S.’s failure to articulate a legal argument for its past
humanitarian interventions.152 That approach not only makes it harder for
150
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Airstrikes, LAWFARE (Apr. 14, 2018, 4:46 PM), http://perma.cc/F6PH-ZHTG. (“As former State
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customary international law to form, but at the same time it makes it easier for the
precedent to be abused by other countries since its contours are left purposely
ambiguous. This time, by announcing that it was acting “lock step” and “in
complete agreement” with the U.K., the U.S. associated itself with a clearly
enunciated legal principle.
Fourth, the underlying humanitarian need in the case of the April 2018
airstrikes was to stop the use of chemical weapons against a civilian population—
a jus cogens norm.153 Rather than target infrastructure, airfields, or government
buildings, as had been the case of past humanitarian interventions, the targets of
the April 2018 strikes were chemical weapons production and storage facilities.154
While a wider principle of humanitarian intervention might be too much for the
international community to buy into at this time, the large majority of states were
more concerned about the Assad regime’s attempt to normalize the use of
chemical weapons and Russia’s willingness to prevent the Security Council from
taking action against Syria than they were about the potential for abuse if future
humanitarian interventions without Security Council authorization are
condoned.155
Finally, many states from all parts of the globe expressed support, while only
a handful opposed the airstrikes. Russia’s opposition was undermined by its
argument that Syria’s responsibility for the chemical attack had not been
sufficiently proved and the fact that it had itself invoked the right of humanitarian
intervention in the South Ossetia case. Its draft Resolution condemning the April
2018 airstrikes was soundly defeated by the Security Council.
While these circumstances render this a strong case for a Grotian Moment,
writing only a few months after the April 2018 airstrikes the author is mindful of
the risk, identified earlier in the article, of making too quick a judgment without
the benefit of historic hindsight.156 Since the Security Council declined to
condemn the airstrikes, the question that this article addresses—whether a limited
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customary international law right of humanitarian intervention has crystalized
from the 2018 Syrian airstrikes—may not require a definitive answer at this time
as there is no pending International Court of Justice or International Criminal
Court case arguing that the strikes were an unlawful act of aggression. But, this
Article’s analysis may render it easier for the U.S. and its allies to marshal support
for follow-up airstrikes against Syrian chemical weapons-related targets if they
should become necessary. Advocates of a right of humanitarian intervention
should be careful, however, in reading this development too broadly, for there is
unlikely to be broad international approval at this time for its application outside
the context of responding to repeated use of chemical weapons against civilians.
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